Security in the Baltic Sea Region - a Guarantee of Stability in Europe

Address by Jüri Luik, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Estonia at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs
2 March 1994, Stockholm


Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a pleasure to be able to speak to this distinguished forum on a topic of concern to all of us, namely security in the Baltic Sea region. As the title of my talk suggests, we in Estonia believe that security in our corner of the world is integral to European security in a wider sense. This belief is based on the geopolitical facts of life. We find ourselves located on the front line, so to speak, of the growing crisis in the East. At the same time, we are at the frontier of democratic and free-market thinking prevalent among our closest neighbors, with whom we share a shoreline. Some would characterize our position as being between The Devil and the Deep Blue Sea.

Our friend, Sweden's Prime Minister Carl Bildt, put it more elegantly in his address to this forum last November, saying, and I quote, "It should be obvious that a pattern of development in which all the Nordic countries become part of an emergent European Union, thus making the three Baltic States part of its "Near Abroad" also in a purely geographic sense, will strengthen security throughout the Baltic and North European area" (end of quote).

I could not agree more, and would go a step further by submitting to you that security in the Baltic Sea region is both a prerequisite for and a guarantee of stability in the whole of Europe. In making this argument, I will highlight three areas of particular interest: first, our security concerns at home; second, recent domestic and foreign policy developments in Russia; and third, the role of the Baltic Sea region in the ongoing transformation of Western security structures.

In Estonia, the highlight of the summer is St. John's Eve on the 24th of June, a holiday which the Teutonic Knights borrowed and Christianized but which is actually derived from the pagan celebration of the summer solstice. This year, however, the highlight of the summer is likely to fall on 31 August, when the last occupying soldier is due to leave Estonian soil. We have reason to believe that this will, in fact, happen. Despite Russia's failure thus far to hand over a timetable for the withdrawal of the remaining 2,700 troops, the withdrawal is continuing, slowly but surely, and people all over Estonia are marking the days remaining on their calendars. When that happy day arrives, we believe our security will be greatly enhanced.

A recent incident at the airfield in Ämari, with which you may be familiar, demonstrates this truth in graphic terms. Last week, a band of five armed and masked men stormed a watch post at the Russian-held Ämari airfield manned by two Russian guards. The guards were beaten and thrown face down in the snow and their guard post burned down. Investigations are continuing as to who was behind this incident, and my government has expressed regret that the incident occurred to the government of the Russian Federation. Still, had the troops been withdrawn from Estonia already by that point, such an incident could not have taken place.

Even after the last active service soldier and officer has left, we will still have plenty of reason to be vigilant. One primary reason is the presence in Estonia of some 10,000 retired and reserve former Soviet officers who were demobilized before August 20, 1991. This number is roughly five times the size of our own fledgling defense forces, and, for pensioners, they tend to be generally young and vital. Because these men served an occupying army, they are not citizens and thus their loyalty to Estonia is questionable, their presence represents a substantial domestic security concern. For this reason, my government has taken a humane but firm stand on the issue. We have made substantial concessions by allowing all those demobilized before the reinstatement of independence in 1991 to apply for residence permits. A special inter-ministerial commission will consider these applications on a case-by-case basis. Needless to say, those who were demobilized after August 1991 will not be permitted to apply for residence permits, because they represent a danger to our very sovereignty. Our stance is in keeping with that of other formerly occupied states. The German Federal Republic, for instance, would hardly tolerate the continued presence in its eastern part of former Soviet soldiers.

One other worry as far as domestic security is concerned is our border with Russia. The arguments over whether the 1920 Tartu Peace Treaty remains in force are well known. Russia continues to control territory that, by the terms of that treaty, actually belongs to Estonia. Any suggestion by Russia that Estonia is the one claiming territory is patently false and demonstrates a weak understanding both of history and of international law. I will speak later of our hopes for the European Union to act as a mediator in this question. In the meantime, however, the Russian Federation has in recent weeks begun demarcating the administrative control line that runs between Russia and Estonia, putting up barbed wire fences and stationing sentinels at the line. This we cannot accept.. It represents a unilateral action that is in direct violation of the obligations undertaken by CSCE member states that allow for border changes only as a result of bilaterally negotiated solutions. We are asking Russia for an explanation of this action within the CSCE context.

But I wish to speak of purely practical border matters as well. The line running between Estonia and Russia continues to be altogether too porous, allowing the illegal transfer into Estonia, among other goods, of drugs, radioactive metals and weapons, not to mention refugees. These contraband goods are generally destined for further export or, in the case of refugees, transport to points West. The unfortunate incident from two weeks ago, in which a container load of 67 Kurdish men, women and children on the verge of suffocation was discovered on an Estonian ship bound for Sweden, is the latest evidence that our borders need to be strengthened. We are grateful to Sweden for having already helped us beef up our border regime, but clearly much more needs to be done.

I turn now to my second point, that is developments in Russia, and how this affects our security.

During the last two months, the campaign of accusations and outright threats from Russia has spiraled dramatically. To name just a few, let us remember Russian President Boris Yeltsin's New Year's greeting to his people, in which he said that in the new year, Russia would begin paying special attention to compatriots living abroad. Then came Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev's address to CIS ambassadors in Moscow, implying that the Baltic states were part of the Near Abroad. This was followed by several bellicose statements by Defense Minister Pavel Grachev about how Russia would not withdraw its troops and then an assertion or two by Kozyrev that Estonia was engaged in ethnic cleansing, an accusation that is not only inaccurate and over-dramatized, but also highly irresponsible, given the continuing carnage in Bosnia.

Last Monday evening, on the eve of our current round of talks with Russia, with the Russian delegation already in Tallinn and as our own negotiating team was driving through the snowy countryside to where the talks would be held, the latest attempt at intimidation was filed with press agencies. This was Russian MFA official Aleksander Udaltsov's statement that Russia would not keep to the final withdrawal date already agreed upon. The exact wording of Udaltsov's statement was telling. He said, and I quote, that "the allegations that Russia has pledged to withdraw its troops from Estonia before August 31st this year are unfounded" (end of quote). This is something like the neighborhood bully saying that allegations that he would stop hitting smaller children in the teeth are unfounded, and is analogous to the classic American lawyers' tautological question of "when did you stop beating your wife?" As you can imagine, this latest statement did not help start the current round of talks on a constructive note, not to mention that it represents yet another setback in the withdrawal process.

What is going on here? A new Russian Foreign Ministry draft program introduced early last month by Russian MFA deputy spokesman Mikhail Demurin may help answer this question. This detailed draft program appears to be a comprehensive plan to reinforce Russia's stated primary foreign policy goal of protecting the interests of ethnic Russians abroad. To this end, the draft program foresees the use of various political, economic and socio-cultural means, including import benefits and banking assistance for businesses outside Russia that are run or dominated by ethnic Russians, and the establishment of a powerful broadcasting network to spread Moscow's word. In introducing the program, Demurin told reporters that the plan was devised because, and I quote, "diplomatic measures are not enough" (end of quote).

It seems to us that the draft program has been compiled in a hurry by a number of state agencies and ministries with very differing mandates, because the draft is uneven and, at times, even internally contradictory in its approach. For instance, we all understand that any state has the right and duty to protect the interests of its citizens living abroad, but the Russia MFA draft speaks of protecting its ethnic compatriots, not citizens. This policy of differentiating people by ethnicity is a stance which Estonia does not accept as civilized behaviour, but which, paradoxically, is a position that Russian officials often accuse Estonia of assuming. Moreover, this is a stance inconsistent with the principles governing free markets.

In addition, the draft program sounds to us very much like Hitler's programme of protecting the so-called Volksdeutsche living outside the boundaries that then constituted Germany. As we all know, Hitler's programme was a justification for the invasion and annexation of the Sudetenland. Because the program refers to ethnic Russians, one is forced to wonder whether the Russian MFA also intends to carry out its program in, say, Brighton Beach, Brooklyn, a suburb of New York City dominated by Russian emigres from the Soviet Union. And finally, Demurin's suggestion that diplomatic measures have been exhausted in relations with what Russia regards as the former Soviet republics seems to suggest that Russia wishes to go beyond diplomacy. We are quite concerned over this, given that Estonia has continued negotiating in good faith in the belief that talks have some intrinsic utility.

I would stray for a moment from the Baltic to the Adriatic in order to discuss Russia's recent moves in the Bosnia crisis, and the implications of those moves. Let me preface my remarks by saying that Estonia welcomes all efforts to stop the bloodshed in that troubled region. We are, however, quite concerned over Russia's attempt to achieve legitimacy and international sanction for what it calls peacekeeping as a side-effect of its well orchestrated initiative in the Balkans. Some have been calling Russia's use of its influence with the Serbs in averting NATO air strikes in Bosnia a grand diplomatic triumph.

We in Estonia think differently. We wonder, to start with, why Russia waited until tens of thousand of people had been killed and maimed to use this influence. We wonder why Russia, and much of the Western world, persists in calling this action a case of neutral peacekeeping under the aegis of the UN? If this is, in fact, a UN force, how can Russian military officials unilaterally declare their intent to remain in place for at least two years. Wouldn't this be for the UN to decide? As for neutrality, figures ranging from Muslim-led Bosnian government officials to US Secretary of State are saying, with various degrees of forthrightness, that the Russia presence is clearly pro-Serbian, and that an even larger Russian role will almost certainly lead to a worsening of the situation. Russian officials themselves have, from the beginning, said they have become involved in order to help their Slavic brothers. Besides, anyone who has seen the CNN pictures of Russian troops arriving in Sarajevo, greeted by women offering flowers and men gesturing the "V" for Victory sign, must understand that this is not a neutral force.

Ladies and Gentlemen, this action sets a most dangerous precedent. We are disturbed by the implications of this move for Russia's claim to conduct so-called peacekeeping activities in what it calls the Near Abroad. Let me say again for the record that the concepts of the Near Abroad are not consistent with those of peacekeeping. Authentic peacekeeping means an internationally sanctioned and neutral force maintaining cease-fires in third areas. As long as Russia continues to claim special rights in its periphery states by virtue of the Near Abroad concept, there can be no neutrality in its actions in those areas. We can easily imagine a scenario in which Russia decides to come to the aid of its Slavic brothers in Estonia under the aegis of a psuedo-legitimacy won by filling the vacuum left in the wake of the West's unwillingness and inability to deal with Bosnia.

These destabilizing developments in and by Russia constitute the Bad News for Baltic Sea regional security. But this leads me to my third point, in other words, the Good News, which is the strong support we have seen in bilateral relations with our closest neighbors in the confused period following Russia's parliamentary elections. Sweden has taken the lead in trying to exert a moderating influence on Russia, at the same time reassuring us that we will not be left alone.

This continued support has not been only bilateral in nature, however. Our neighbors have also pushed hard to accelerate our integration into those Western structures that may help to counterbalance the crisis in the East. As you know, we have been strong advocates of establishing regional security tables within the CSCE framework, and would like to inject an element of security policy into the activities of the Council of Baltic Sea States.

Further afield, we have signed the Partnership for Peace framework document, as you know, and regard this as a first step toward eventual NATO membership. We are especially interested in advancing the cause of true peacekeeping activities within the PFP context, and to that end are in the process of establishing a joint peacekeeping battalion with our Baltic neighbors. I would take this opportunity to express our sincere gratitude to Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland and the United Kingdom for offering to help train this fledgling battalion.

We saw another expression of our growing integration with Europe at the summit meeting of European Union foreign ministers in Copenhagen two weeks ago. Although our negotiations for free trade pacts are continuing, the fact that we received approval to sign Europe Agreements within this year sends a positive signal, indeed. In this connection I would mention that we strongly support and welcome Sweden's membership in the EU at the soonest opportunity. Not only would speedy membership bolster Sweden domestically, but it also strengthen Stockholm's role in the international arena. Clearly, both of these developments are in our interest Finally, we welcome any support in bringing the European Pact for Stability to life. Through this Pact, we hope both to resolve open questions regarding our border with the Russian Federation as well as to give our efforts to integrate aliens into Estonian society a much needed shot in the arm.

I would wrap up this final point by stating the obvious. Much has changed in the international security environment since my Prime Minister spoke at this forum one year and 11 days ago, but some things remain the same. Last year, Prime Minister Mart Laar told you, and I quote, that "It is imperative to realize that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania cannot be abandoned, not only for their own sake, but for the precedent that deserting our countries would set. We are willing to help in the struggle for democracy; we hope that you will be willing to help us too" (end of quote).

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would conclude my remarks today with a maxim set down in the first century B.C. by Greek philosopher Publius Syrus, who said (and I quote) that "anyone can hold the helm when the sea is calm" (end of quote). My friends, the Baltic Sea is a relatively shallow body of water, and this shallowness can lend a deceptive sense of safety. As any sailor knows, however, storms have a greater effect in shallow than in deep waters. We live in politically tempestuous times; the sea is not yet calm. I believe you share my view that the storms which threaten the security of our region are not merely tempests in teapots. But I remain convinced that with continued and increased cooperation, with a little diplomatic skill and a touch of luck, we can together hold the helm even in troubled waters and safely reach shore.


Thank you.