Estonia, Sweden, and the Post-Post-Cold War Era

Remarks by Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Estonian Minister for Foreign Affairs, at the Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm, January 9, 1997


Introduction

Honoured guests,
Ladies and gentlemen,

Thank you for inviting me to speak to you today. Rarely has the discussion of foreign policy been more important; rarely have the stakes been higher for us all. I have come here today on my first official visit abroad as foreign minister, in the first week of this year, to tell you that in 1997 we stand at a crucial juncture in European and world history.

My address tonight will consist of four parts. The first will be a brief reflection on the common history and future opportunities that Estonia and Sweden share, the second a broad overview of the fundamental international re-alignment that I believe is already upon us; the third and fourth will be analyses of European Union and NATO enlargement respectively.


I. Sweden and Estonia

No writer of fiction could ever get away with the symbolism of Estonia's and Sweden's ambassadors in Washington, DC.: Henrik Liljegren, the Swedish ambassador was born in Estonia, and the undersigned, then Estonia's ambassador, was born in Stockholm. How that came to be is a story that touches on the high and lowpoints of this century's turns in the area around the Baltic Sea. Henrik Liljegren´s Estonian father met his Swedish wife while studying in Sweden, a normal occurrence in the 1930´s; my parents met as refugees who had fled as children from Stalinist terror in Estonia. While it is understandable that a Swede would return home in time of war, it was through the magnanimity of Sweden that my parents were welcomed in as part of the first large immigrant wave that Sweden has experienced in the modern era.

I am pleased and proud that the Estonians who grew up in their adoptive homeland have repaid that debt, becoming the most successful of all immigrant groups in Sweden. Today the 30 thousand or so Estonians who came to Sweden, often in small 4 meter boats across the tempestuous Baltic Sea, occupy leadership positions in many of Sweden's most prominent firms, in government, journalism, and among all of the major political parties. Their success represents a living tribute to the openness of your society.

This migration, however, was not the beginning of Estonian-Swedish relations, which if we ignore the sacking of Sigtuna in 1187 by Estonians, has almost always been uniformly good. Swedish-Estonian ties in fact go back to before written history: Swedes lived on the Estonian islands and West coast already before the conquest of my country by German knights in the 13th. This group of Swedes comprised the only truly indigenous minority we know. Relations between Estonians and Estonian Swedes were exemplary in their harmony and Estonian Swedish families have played a prominent role in our history. Indeed, among the many tragic losses suffered by Estonia in W.W.II was the wholesale departure of the Estonian Swedes to their ancestral homeland.

Since it has been a mere five years since the recent fifty year interregnum of Soviet rule ended, it is useful to compare those fifty years with another period, the one hundred and fifty years that Estonia was under Swedish rule. To this very day Estonians still refer to that period as the "Good Old Swedish Times". And little wonder: During that period, higher education was first established in Estonia at what today is called Tartu University; elementary education was actively promoted by Stockholm, leading to an unprecedented growth in the literacy rate among Estonian peasants.

Conditions for the peasantry were considerably improved by Sweden's policy of restricting the rights of the baronial lords, which ultimately led to the manumission of the serfs shortly before the end of Swedish rule in 1711. Unfortunately, all of these progressive reforms were reversed when Sweden lost the Great Northern War: the Academia Gustaviana was shut down, education for the peasants suppressed and Estonians re-enserfed under far harsher conditions than they had ever known.

In 1918, after the establishment of the independence of what at the time were considered nota bene! the Four Baltic States of Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Sweden took a look at its resources and devoted them to guaranteeing the independence of Finland and its integration into the Nordic Community. It was a wise policy that paid off.

Since the re-establishment of Estonian independence Sweden has taken the same course regarding Estonia:
first in playing a key role in the withdrawal of foreign troops from our country
second as the number 2 investor in Estonia, first place in large investments.
third, as one of the leading advocates for Estonia's entry into the EU, and fourth as a leader in developing the security of the Baltic region through the Persson initiative to develop the entire economic prosperity of the entire Baltic Sea basin.
The Swedish-Estonian relationship works so well because it is a win-win relationship, i.e. something beneficial to both countries.

Consider the issue of Swedish security. The fact that Soviet military forces, including strategic bombers and surface to surface missiles with nuclear warheads, are no longer based 300 km from Stockholm and 80 km from Helsinki has completely changed the security situation for Sweden. This in turn has dramatic consequences for military expenditure and military man-power needs, a genuine "peace dividend" as a result of the end of the Cold War. With the demise of a hostile Soviet Union and the re-establishment of Estonian independence, one can say quite categorically that Sweden has not enjoyed as secure an environment in the Baltic area since the beginning of the 18th century. Thus the recent changes in the Baltic Sea area provide Sweden with an historic opportunity to redesign the security architecture of the region.

Economically too, Estonia is an important partner for Sweden. If we look at exports per capita in Sweden, Estonia is in fourth place after such natural export countries as Finland, Denmark and Norway, and, interestingly enough, ahead of Germany. As the purchasing power of Estonia increases, we hope to move up on that scale. Thus prosperity in Estonia is very much in Sweden's interest.

Today, I would like to briefly propose one area where mutual economic interests could be developed even more intensively. Following the ASEAN model, where Japan has expanded its world market share by realizing its Research and Development innovations in the rising Asian tigers in return for lower-cost, skilled labour, it doesn't take a Nobel prize in economics to see that a similar symbiotic relationship could reap tremendous economic benefits for both Sweden and Estonia. Swedish firms, in a broad range of sectors of the economy, are world famous for their expertise in research and development. Estonia, as some companies have already discovered, has a highly educated and low cost labour force. The combination of intelligent Swedish design and efficient Estonian production would be a positive-sum relationship for both parties: Estonia would gain foreign investment and assistance in the modernisation of production facilities, and in return, through lower costs of production Sweden could make a bold push toward capturing a larger share of the world's markets for the results of Swedish R&D.

Estonia owes a great debt to Sweden for her support of Estonia's accession to the European Union. We welcome the role that Sweden has played in convincing the "hesitant and half-hearted," as Prime Minister Persson has called them, that EU enlargement will be beneficial to everyone. I commend you not for your altruism, but for your foresight. A future in which Estonia is a democratic, free-market EU member is good not only for Estonia, but also for Sweden, and in turn for the rest of Europe. Political stability and expanded markets on the southern shores of the Baltic Sea are only in your interests too.

Within the context of the European Union, there remains a remnant of the past: Estonia does not have a visa-free travel regime with Sweden. I sincerely hope that in the next months Sweden and Estonia will be able to overcome the obstacles that have obstructed the initiation of visa-free travel between our two countries. While it is important to consider the macro-level issues of European security, it is also important not to forget that there are micro-level initiatives that can be undertaken in the short run that will have an immediate and positive effect on the daily lives of our citizens. The establishment of visa-free travel would be an example of such a concrete step which would eliminate the need for both Swedes and Estonians to wait in line for visas. By achieving visa-free travel between our two states we would also be joining in the wider European trend towards the elimination of barriers on the free movement of individuals.


II. Re-alignment

The period from 1989-1991 saw a fundamental realignment in Europe after 50 years of a fairly stable manichean division between one camp, NATO and its capitalist fellow-travellers, the "neutrals", on the one side and on the other side, a classic empire, the USSR, along with its Eastern Europe minions. Half a decade ago this order collapsed. This re-alignment caught most of Western and Northern Europe unawares --certainly no one had seriously foreseen, let alone planned this result.
Unable to cope with changes that no one had really prepared for in their magnitude and depth, the West felt at first a wave of relief following the end of the Cold War, but quickly realised that accompanying the decrease in overt military threat was an increase in unpredictability, potential chaos and instability. It is this inchoate, unfamiliar and unpredictable state of affairs that has come to be called the Post-Cold War Era. Such a situation, however, cannot last for long. The sudden collapse of the Cold-War alignment and the appearance of a new, altogether different Europe that we call the Post-Cold War era led in turn to a series of moves by the West to manage the situation, at least temporarily, and then fashion a new order. The primary vehicles for this "re-fashioning" came to be the enlargement of NATO and the European Union.

This "Post-Cold War era," characterised by instability, and a groping in the dark for solutions to re-establish some sense of stability following the collapse of a dangerous, but ordered, and hence predictable Cold-War order, has now lasted some six years, and in the next year or two or three, we will see the undertaking of major steps to create a new order, no longer the Post-Cold War era but rather a "Post-Post-Cold War era", by all accounts a very awkward name.

All of this has been seen before, specifically in the mess faced by Europe at the end of W.W.II. The chaos, instability and eruptions of the 1945-1949 period, with civil war in Greece and putsches--both successful and unsuccessful--in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Finland, was put to an end with the emergence of the Cold-War order in the beginning of the 1950s with the founding of NATO in 1949, and the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1950. The latter of course evolved into the Common Market and then the European Union.

In precisely the same way Europe now stands on the threshold of the Post-Post-Cold War era. A period of uncertain attempts to grapple with the unforeseen and radical realignment is coming to a close. A new European architecture, inevitably more structured and fixed than that of the last five years, far more similar in its stability and resistance to change to the Cold-War period, is about to emerge. There is little doubt that it is in everyone's interest that this be done right.

With the goal of replacing "Post-post-cold war" with something with a more positive ring, I suggest we perhaps call it the "European 21st Century Era", which may sound somewhat millenarian but in the end some kind of name is necessary.

In the past years Estonia has transformed itself from a territory with the attributes of statehood -- a flag, an elected government, UN membership, etc.--into a state, with a functioning governmental apparatus, a booming economy, an energetic and effective diplomatic service, and a small but well-regarded military that commendably discharges its duties in international peace-keeping operations. Caught up in the stereotypes and regional generalisations of the immediate Post-Cold War era, few people, apart perhaps from businessmen and women, have noticed this transformation.

Ladies and gentlemen,

It is time to notice. As Estonia restores and surpasses the statehood enjoyed in the era 1918-1940, a new Estonian is being born: knowledgeable, proud and self-confident, European in outlook, and hungry for achievement in a pioneer kind of way typically associated more with America than the continent. The new Estonian will shape the Estonia of tomorrow; his attitudes will become the national attitude, his sensitivities will become the national sensitivities.

Economically, Estonia has also passed out of the transition period. With an economy more privatised than many in Western Europe, we now face a paradox: soon we will no longer be a special case, but merely a capitalist country that is temporarily poor. Looking at the rubble of Germany and Japan after W.W.II, or the near basket cases of Southeast Asia twenty years ago, few would have predicted the dramatic rise in living standards in evidence today. So too with the post-socialist states. The poor little brethren of Eastern Europe will not remain so forever.


III. European Union Enlargement

In the formation of the "European 21st Century Era" the enlargement of both the European Union and NATO will be the driving forces of re-alignment. In comparison, the two organisations are radically different in their structure and purpose. The EU is an entirely different animal from NATO, in that it is not a solid web of connectedness in one dimension--namely military readiness--but rather a much deeper effort. If NATO is analogous to a system of telephony across a country, then the EU can be seen as the rest of the infrastructure that binds a country together.


Baltic co-operation has been very strong since the re-establishment of independence in 1991. From that point onwards we have sought out the common ground we share with Latvia and Lithuania in all fields. Moving forward, the three Baltic states are working towards achieving the closest and most extensive possible co-operation. We have set as our goal the attainment of the kind of co-operation evident between the Nordic States. While aknowledging that we are three different countries with different histories, economies and political structures, we strive to be mutually supportive in the pursuit of our common interests.

In the interests of stability and co-operation in Europe, the enlargement of the European Union must proceed on the basis of an objective, individual and transparent evaluation of each applicant country. Each associated country's efforts and success in reforming its polity and economy must be measured against an objective measuring stick to determine who is ready, and who is not ready, to join the integrated family of the European Union. Each country must be evaluated individually, not as a geographical bloc; the applicant countries have not undertaken free-market democratic reform as blocs, nor will they function within the European Union as blocs. The entire process must be conducted transparently, with well-known criteria, so that no country will feel that its fate has been decided for it behind closed doors.

As an Estonian I am proud of my country's rapid progress in moving out from under the harmful legacy of imposed authoritarianism toward democracy, and from a centrally planned economy to one guided by the invisible hand of the market. I am proud to say that Estonia's reforms have been among the quickest and most far-reaching of the post-socialist states. However, I am most proud of the fact that I am not alone in holding this opinion. On the economic front, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has consistently ranked Estonia among the most rapid and comprehensive reformers of the former Communist bloc. It is worthwhile noting that Estonia has already met three out of the four official requirements for entrance into the European Monetary Union system. We are approaching convergence with our inflation rate, the fourth criteria, which while still high, is now exponentially lower than it was in 1992, only five years ago.

In the sphere of political reform, we have moved forward from possessing only the legislative underpinnings of democracy to existing as a fully functioning democracy. In contrast to many other post-socialist states, free and fair elections have long ceased to be news. In Estonia in 1997 we have the sweet privilege, which was stripped from us for so long and which in the history of our planet such a small number have enjoyed, of living in an open society with constitutionally guaranteed freedoms, strong civilian control of the military, and a vibrant non-governmental third sector. Again this state of affairs has been confirmed by independent parties. Freedom House, an American civil liberties watchdog group, now ranks Estonia in its "completely free" category, alongside France, Italy and Japan.

It is this kind of progress in reform that the European Union must evaluate when deciding who will gain entrance in the first wave. After all, what is the accession process meant to be determining if not who will be ready to integrate with the mature market democracies? It is crucially important that this decision not be based on geopolitical factors. Admitting countries based on the accident of their location, rather than on the progress of their reform will send a clear and dangerous message to the countries of Eastern and Central Europe. Mark my words, that message will be simple: it does not matter whether you reform or not. Nothing that you can do and none of your efforts will have any influence on the date of your accession into the European Union.

Ladies and gentlemen,

There is absolutely no doubt in my mind that Estonia will be the touchstone of EU enlargement. If the process is to be based on an objective evaluation of the progress of reform, we should be admitted at the outset. If it is to be based on geopolitical considerations, then we may be excluded. If we are excluded, there will obviously be substantial negative repercussions for Estonia, but the damage done will not end at the borders of my small state. The consequences of this decision will be enormous for all of the current and prospective members of the European Union, for the continent as a whole. If the criteria for enlargement are geopolitical and not the progress of reform, I predict that there will be a profound destabilisation. The end result can only be a dangerous delay in the formation of the new European order.


IV. NATO Enlargement

The re-alignment, or re-structuring, that has received the most press coverage in recent months has been the planned enlargement of NATO, which is to be announced at the NATO summit in July of this year. The first wave of entrants are scheduled to officially join in 1999, a symbolic decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In the rhetorical storm that has arisen around the issue of NATO enlargement it has been quite easy to lose sight of some of the fundamental issues. It is very important first of all to remember that NATO will not be enlarging through imposed expansion; rather, NATO is opening itself up to those new democracies of Eastern and Central Europe who have indicated their proactive desire to join.
Why does Estonia want to join NATO? The answer is twofold. First, NATO has always proclaimed that it is a defence Alliance based on common democratic values. Estonia shares those democratic values. Thus it is entirely natural that we should want to co-operate with NATO in guaranteeing those values. Second, NATO is in the process of re-creating itself as an entirely new NATO within a new Europe. Estonia does not want to join the NATO of the Cold War. In both location and spirit Estonia is a part of the new Europe and we feel entitled to be constructively involved in the formation of the new European defence arrangement.

The NATO enlargement process, like that of the European Union should not be conducted in a way that is completely incomprehensible to outsiders. Enlargement decision making must be transparent to all aspirant countries, and it must be transparent to Russia; in addition, the negotiation of the NATO relationship with Russia must be transparent to all the other Partner Countries.

The central principle of NATO enlargement must be the indivisibility of security; an increase in security for some states cannot mean a decrease in security for others. The oft repeated statements that "the door will remain open" and the "first will not be the last" must remain credible come July; otherwise there is the risk of causing what in other contexts I have referred to as the "Dean Acheson effect" after the U.S. Secretary of State who, rightly or wrongly, was accused of precipitating the Korean conflict by neglecting to explicitly mention South Korea among the countries the U.S. would defend. We can in fact distinguish a weak and a strong form of the Acheson effect. The strong form is fairly dire and one would hope for all of us, unlikely; to whit, that by taking in a small number of applicant countries, and then shutting the door, NATO says in effect, that those countries not taken in are on their own.

There is also a weak form of the Acheson effect, and that is economic. It is clear that whichever countries are chosen for the first round of NATO enlargement will benefit economically far out of proportion to the progress they have made in moving toward a market economy. It is simply a fact that foreign investors will be more willing to invest in an East European NATO member than a non-member. What greater security can you have for the safety of your investment than Article V?

As part of Estonia's preparation for eventual NATO membership, we have been active participants in both the Partnership for Peace program and our own Intensified Dialogue with NATO. The Partnership for Peace, the most extensive military co-operation program in European history, has been a tremendous positive learning experience for both NATO and the armed forces of all PfP states. The Estonian officer corps have benefited greatly from the opportunity to learn command, communication and control strategies, the so-called three "C"s, as well as the other skills essential to modern soldiering, during joint PfP exercises. NATO has made great strides in learning how to combine the defence forces of a staggeringly large number of nations into a cohesive whole.

In all likelihood discussions in the coming months will lead to an enhanced version of the Partnership for Peace, which will provide new opportunities for all PfP members on a military operational level. The enhanced PfP will probably include among other new features increased input for partners into the planning of future Combined Joint Task Force missions (such as IFOR), partner offices in regional headquarters, and NATO offices in partner countries.

Estonia has also put forward a "self-differentiation" proposal. Estonia has suggested that NATO offer some form of political recognition to PfP members who "self-differentiate" themselves on the basis of 1)sharing the common values of the Alliance and 2)willingness to join the Alliance. We propose that these countries be officially defined as "Applicant Partners."

This year will also mark the process of the adaptation of the Conventional Forces in Europe agreement. The agreement reached in May, 1996, was somewhat short-sighted. This time the decision-making process must be more open, and must reflect the security concerns of non-CFE countries.


Conclusion

Ladies and Gentlemen,
In conclusion,

the next six months will see a realignment of Europe as significant as the re-alignment that took place in 1989-91 with the collapse of the Soviet empire. With NATO as well as EU enlargement reaching a fundamental decision point in the middle of 1997, we can say with some assurance that the "Post-Cold-War era" is coming to an end, and that a new era is beginning.

The enlargement of both NATO and the EU will be the mechanism by which that new era is inaugurated. As I stated earlier, Estonia's fate will be a clear indicator of the principles under which European Union enlargement will take place. In the interests of European stability and the completion of post-socialist transition in Eastern and Central Europe, EU enlargement must be based on the progress of reform, and not on geopolitical variables. NATO enlargement, and PfP enhancement, must be transparent and protect the indivisibility of security in Eastern and Central Europe.

By virtue of our geographical position within Europe, both Sweden and Estonia have no choice but to participate in the process of change. I hope that we will have the wisdom to positively influence the impending re-alignment, just as I hope that our two countries will continue to co-operate across the broad range of economic, social and political issue areas that we have in the past.

Thank you.